The Federal Government’s Security Policy Strategy 2026 is a strategic framework document. It defines priorities, threat profiles, and long-term strategic directions. Those looking for explicit tools to combat disinformation will therefore not find ready-made instruments, but rather a security policy logic within which disinformation is embedded. This very embedding is noteworthy because it removes the handling of disinformation from a purely media or education perspective and shifts it into the realm of state security architecture.

Disinformation as a Security Policy Threat

The report explicitly understands disinformation as part of so-called hybrid threats. The treatment of the topic of disinformation stems, among other things, from a motion by the National Council’s Security Policy Committee. It is not considered in isolation, but rather in the context of cyberattacks, espionage, and sabotage. The clear categorization is striking: Disinformation is primarily described as an instrument of state or state-affiliated actors who deliberately aim to sow uncertainty and divide societies.

This places an important emphasis on the issue. From this perspective, disinformation is not a marginal phenomenon of digital communication, but a security policy factor that can influence democratic stability. It is therefore not just about false information, but about strategic manipulation of social cohesion and political decision-making processes.

Resilience as the central response logic

The actual “counter-strategy” against disinformation is not formulated as a single measure, but is anchored in the principle of resilience. This logic is crucial because it does not rely on defense in the narrow sense, but on the resilience of the entire system.

This refers to the ability of society, institutions, and political processes to remain stable even under targeted informational pressure. Trust in state institutions, the functioning of democratic processes, and social cohesion thus become security policy factors.

Indirectly, this also means that a society is safer the less susceptible it is to disinformation. The focus thus shifts away from mere reaction and toward structural robustness.

Societal Integration and Informal Prevention

Another important aspect is the holistic societal approach. The report emphasizes that security is not solely the responsibility of state security agencies, but can only be achieved in cooperation with the economy, academia, and civil society.

This is particularly relevant with regard to disinformation because it results in an indirect logic of prevention. While topics such as media literacy, the early detection of manipulative narratives, and the strengthening of critical information management are not explicitly formulated as operational programs, they are clearly embedded in the security architecture.

This makes it clear that the state views the fight against disinformation not only in the technical or regulatory sphere, but also in society’s handling of information itself.

Protecting Democratic Processes as a Core Mission

Another key point is the protection of democratic opinion-forming and decision-making processes. The report explicitly acknowledges that precisely these processes can be the target of influence operations.

This formulates a clear security policy mandate: democratic institutions and political decision-making must be protected from targeted manipulation—regardless of whether it originates from within or without.

It is important that this protection is not understood as a restriction of democratic freedom, but rather as a prerequisite for its functioning. The integrity of public debate thus becomes a security asset in itself.

What the report deliberately omits

Just as important as what it contains is what it omits. The summary report contains no concrete technical or regulatory measures against disinformation. There are no elaborated fact-checking structures, no platform regulation, and no detailed guidelines for content moderation.

This is not an oversight, but rather an expression of the document’s strategic level. Operational implementation steps are typically developed in subsequent strategies, action plans, or specialized technical concepts. Accordingly, no concrete political programs can be derived from the report.

Context

Overall, the Security Policy Strategy 2026 clearly demonstrates that disinformation is understood as a serious security policy factor. It is embedded in the concept of hybrid threats, addressed through resilience strategies, and closely linked to the protection of democratic processes.

At the same time, the approach remains deliberately abstract. The state does not define individual instruments, but rather an architecture for dealing with such threats. The strategy also does not name individual actors as normatively validated representatives of specific approaches. Instead, it describes a field in which many different contributions—governmental, academic, civil society, and media—can play a role. The document legitimizes the relevance of the topic, not individual projects or organizations.